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ABSTRACT The way that diseases such as high blood pressure (hypertension),
high cholesterol, and diabetes are defined is closely tied to ideas about modifiable risk.
In particular, the threshold for diagnosing each of these conditions is set at the level
where future risk of disease can be reduced by lowering the relevant parameter (of
blood pressure, low-density lipoprotein, or blood glucose, respectively). In this article, I
make the case that these criteria, and those for diagnosing and treating other “risk-
based diseases,” reflect an unfortunate trend towards reclassifying risk as disease. I closely
examine stage 1 hypertension and high cholesterol and argue that many patients diag-
nosed with these “diseases” do not actually have a pathological condition. In addition,
though, I argue that the fact that they are risk factors, rather than diseases, does not
diminish the importance of treating them, since there is good evidence that such treat-
ment can reduce morbidity and mortality. For both philosophical and ethical reasons,
however, the conditions should not be labeled as pathological.The tendency to reclas-
sify risk factors as diseases is an important trend to examine and critique.
SOME OF THE MOST COMMON “diseases” of modern medicine—includinghypertension, high cholesterol, and diabetes—are defined based on risk.Take
hypertension, for example.A blood pressure is defined as “elevated” if there is evi-
dence that lowering it will reduce cardiovascular risk.The existence of modifiable
risk is similarly central to the definition of high cholesterol and diabetes, in those
cases for the parameters of low-density lipoprotein (LDL) and blood glucose,
respectively. Symptoms are secondary:many patients who have hypertension, high
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cholesterol, or mild diabetes are asymptomatic.The presence of risk that can be
lowered is the key reason many patients are defined as having these diseases.
This focus on risk developed during the second half of the 20th century due
to multiple factors, ranging from advances in epidemiological science to the eco-
nomic interests and marketing practices of pharmaceutical companies (Greene
2007). But defining modifiable risk as pathology also raises important concep-
tual and ethical issues.The central question is whether these “risk-based diseases”
(as I shall call them) are really pathological.1 In this paper, I claim that they are
not. Focusing on stage 1 hypertension and high cholesterol, I argue that most pa-
tients diagnosed with these disorders have only a risk factor for future disease,
not a current pathological condition.
First, I describe the guidelines for diagnosing and treating high blood pressure
and high cholesterol and review the evolution of these criteria. I then describe
definitions of the concept of “disease” and argue that neither stage 1 hyperten-
sion nor high cholesterol fits the best ones. I claim that this conclusion does not
weaken the importance of diagnosing and treating such conditions, relying on
Norman Daniels’s (1985, 2000) model of health-care justice. I conclude by ex-
ploring how labeling stage 1 hypertension and high cholesterol as pathological
creates ethical problems by veiling the complex risk/benefit judgments that are
part of a fully informed decision to treat them.
Two Risk-Based Diseases:
Hypertension and High Cholesterol
For both stage 1 hypertension and high cholesterol, the levels that count as de-
serving medical attention are those for which there is evidence that treatment
can reduce the risk of future cardiovascular disease.To focus the discussion, I shall
discuss use an imaginary patient named MH, a 60-year-old woman who is
otherwise healthy and taking no medications, but who has a blood pressure of
150/80 mm Hg and an LDL level of 140 mg/dL.
Hypertension
Because of her systolic blood pressure of 150 mm Hg, MH has hypertension,
specifically stage 1 hypertension, diagnosed for patients with a systolic blood
pressure of 140–159 mm Hg or a diastolic blood pressure 90–99 mm Hg (JNC
2003, referred to hereafter as JNC 7). If modifications in diet and exercise can-
not reduce the blood pressure, then pharmacological treatment is indicated.
Symptoms are not the issue, since most patients with stage 1 hypertension are
asymptomatic. In addition, these patients usually have no identifiable pathologi-
cal changes in the systems that regulate blood pressure.What matters is that for
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patients with blood pressure in this range, there is good evidence that using avail-
able medications to lower the blood pressure also reduces cardiovascular risk.As
the guidelines state:“The ultimate public health goal of antihypertensive therapy
is to reduce cardiovascular and renal morbidity and mortality” (p. 25).
Admittedly, patients with more severe hypertension, such as those with stage 2
hypertension (blood pressure ≥ 160/100 mm Hg),may have significant symptoms,
such as headache and visual changes. At particularly elevated blood pressures,
urgent hypertension occurs,where there is evidence of damage to the eyes or kid-
neys. For these levels of hypertension, treatment may be justified partly based on
symptoms and demonstrable pathology, but this does not apply in general for
stage 1 hypertension, or even for many patients with stage 2 hypertension.
The current guidelines reflect a transformation in ideas about hypertension
that occurred during the second half of the 20th century, as the condition
evolved from one defined in terms of symptoms and clear pathological signs to
one defined in terms of risk. For example, as Jeremy Greene (2007) points out,
when Franklin Delano Roosevelt had blood pressures of 260/150 mm Hg in the
early 1940s, no treatment was indicated or initiated, partly due to the absence of
any specific symptoms (p. 7).This changed in the 1950s and 1960s, as hyperten-
sion was redefined as a condition that could be asymptomatic—the “silent
killer”—and diagnostic guidelines were formulated based on specific blood-
pressure levels.Multiple factors played a role in this transformation, including the
advent of epidemiological research that identified risk factors for cardiovascular
disease (most importantly the Framingham study), the use of actuarial tables by
life insurance companies, and the economic interests of pharmaceutical compa-
nies. This last factor played a particularly large role, especially through marketing
practices that have had wide-ranging effects on medical research and practice
(Greene 2007).
Over this period, the definition of hypertension has continually expanded. For
instance, guidelines released in 1984 reduced the diastolic cutoff from 95 mm Hg
to 90 mm Hg (JNC 1984).At this point, systolic blood pressures of 140–159 mm
Hg were still considered “borderline” in patients with normal diastolic pressure
and no other risk factors, and physicians could choose not to treat. Less than 10
years later, new guidelines recommended treatment for all such patients, thus re-
sulting in the criteria that determine that the patient MH counts as having a con-
dition that should be treated.
Since the guidelines are determined by evidence about modifiable risk, there
is no limit to how many people in society can be counted as having this disease.
Although MH has hypertension, her blood pressure is also near the median for
women her age (JNC 7). In fact, due to the typical slow increase of blood pres-
sure with aging, more than 90% of Americans living to 85 years old will develop
hypertension, according to current guidelines (JNC 7). Again, what matters is
not the specific level of an individual’s blood pressure and/or cardiovascular risk,
but that the risk can be reduced with available and safe medical treatment.
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Hypercholesterolemia
MH also qualifies as having high cholesterol by current criteria (NCEP 2002,
referred to hereafter as ATP III). According to these guidelines, the cutoff for
specific patients depends on the number of other risk factors they have for coro-
nary heart disease (CHD), such as age, smoking, or hypertension). In patients
with zero or one risk factors, the cutoff for diagnosis and treatment is an LDL
level of 160 mg/dL; for patients with more than two risk factors, it’s 130 mg/dL
(ATP III). For patients with CHD, or with a particularly high risk of developing
it (such as patients who have diabetes), the cutoff drops to 100 mg/dL (ATP III).
Patient MH has two risk factors—age ≥ 55 years and hypertension—so her cut-
off is 130 mg/dL. Her LDL level of 140 mg/dL counts as high.
The guidelines for the diagnosis and treatment of high cholesterol have been
explicitly formulated in relation to patients’ probability of developing cardiovas-
cular disease, as can be seen by the link between the presence of risk factors and
the level of LDL that counts as abnormal.Treating MH is justified by evidence
that her overall morbidity and mortality from cardiovascular disease would be
lower if she were placed on a statin medication (an HMG-coA reductase inhib-
itor such as Zocor or Lipitor).As for stage 1 hypertension, symptoms are not the
issue, since the vast majority of patients with high cholesterol will be asympto-
matic (Dale and Federman 2007).The only exception is the very small number
of patients who have extremely high levels of cholesterol due to the genetic con-
dition of familial hypercholesterolemia and who often exhibit signs such as xan-
thomas (Dale and Federman, 2007).
Many people will count as having high cholesterol even though their level is
near average or even below. MH’s LDL is actually below the mean for women
her age (143 mg/dL; ATP III, Appendix III-A). As for the definition of hyper-
tension, the idea of elevated risk here refers to the existence of risk that can be
lowered, rather than any comparison with the mean for the population.
All these features of the diagnosis of high cholesterol can be seen in the long
delay between the recognition of cholesterol as a risk factor in the 1950s and
1960s and the institution of widespread treatment in the 1990s.The problem was
that before the advent of the statin medications, treatments or diets that could
lower cholesterol had no significant effect on morbidity or mortality (Greene
2007). In the 1990s, a series of large, randomized, placebo-controlled studies
showed that using statin medications to lower cholesterol in certain patient pop-
ulations could reduce cardiovascular disease and mortality. The earliest studies
were done with patients who had already had a heart attack or stroke and had
elevated levels of cholesterol, and later studies then moved on to show benefits
in patients without documented CHD and with lower and lower levels of cho-
lesterol (Greene 2007).
Many of these studies were funded by pharmaceutical companies and were
designed to justify expanding the definition of high cholesterol (Greene 2007).
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Nevertheless, the research showed convincingly that cardiovascular morbidity
and mortality could be reduced in these populations by lowering cholesterol.
The question is not whether reducing cholesterol reduces risk of CHD, since it
clearly does for many patients, but whether classifying the condition of “high
cholesterol” as a disease is appropriate. I argue that it is not.
Other Risk-Based Diseases
This paper focuses on hypertension and high cholesterol, but there are other
conditions similarly defined on the basis of the presence of modifiable risk. For
example, in the late 1990s the cutoff for diagnosing diabetes was reduced to a
fasting blood glucose of 126 mg/dL, from the previous 140 mg/dL, greatly ex-
panding the number of patients who count as having this disorder (Report of
the Expert Committee 1997; Schwartz and Woloshin 1999).The reason for this
shift is that even though such patients will often have no symptoms, research sug-
gests that starting treatment at the lower levels can reduce risk of microvascular
damage (e.g., retinopathy).
Obesity and osteoporosis are other conditions where the presence of modifi-
able risk has become definitive of disease.There are differences among these risk-
based diseases, including their prevalence, associated symptoms and risks, and the
availability of pharmaceutical or other medical options for treating them, and I
shall not discuss all these conditions here. I only wish to note that the trend
towards defining disease on the basis of modifiable risk is not limited to the con-
ditions of hypertension and high cholesterol.
Hypertension and High Cholesterol
and the Definition of Disease
The current definitions of hypertension and high cholesterol seriously strain tra-
ditional concepts of disease. Although by current guidelines patient MH has
stage 1 hypertension and high cholesterol, I will argue that she does not have a
disease. In particular, her conditions do not meet the criteria laid out by some of
the most important accounts of the concept of disease—in particular, the “dys-
function-requiring” theories (Boorse 1977, 1987, 1997;Wakefield 1992a, 1992b,
1999a, 1999b)—and thus she should be considered healthy. It is true that some
approaches to defining disease—such as the “malady” account of Culver and
Gert (1982)—would classify stage 1 hypertension and high cholesterol as pathol-
ogy. But, I shall argue, this reflects the well-known flaw with such approaches,
that they tend to classify healthy conditions as diseases.
A quick note here about terminology: when writing about the idea of nor-
mal functioning and pathology, theorists use various terms for the notion they
are trying to capture, ranging from disease to disorder to malady. In all these cases,
though, the writers specify that they are referring to the general notion of “path-
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ology,” which is meant to include diseases, syndromes, injuries, and so forth
(Boorse 1997; Culver and Gert 1982;Wakefield 1999a). I shall use the term dis-
ease here, but again with the stipulation that I am interested in the more general
notion of pathology.The question is whether the bulk of patients diagnosed with
risk-based diseases truly have pathology or only a risk factor for developing
pathology.
Dysfunction-Requiring Accounts of Disease
Analyses of the concept of disease can be separated into those that are “dys-
function-requiring” (DR)—those that include a criterion referring to the pres-
ence of dysfunction—and those that avoid any such criterion, and thus are “non-
dysfunction-requiring” (non-DR) (Schwartz 2007a). In addition to proposing
and defending a seminal version of the DR approach,Christopher Boorse (1977,
1987, 1997) also makes a point of rejecting any criterion that refers to the “dis-
value” of a condition.This is the most notorious part of his definition, and much
discussion of it focuses on this commitment to “naturalism” (Reznek 1987). But
there is no reason why an account cannot include a DR criterion as well as a
criterion referring to the disvalue of the condition. Jerome Wakefield (1992a,
1992b, 1999a, 1999b) proposes just such an account, arguing that for a condition
to be a disease it has to be a “harmful dysfunction”—in other words, it must re-
flect biological dysfunction and must be judged as “harmful.”
Here I shall assume a DR approach. It doesn’t matter for my purposes whether
there is an additional requirement requiring that the condition is harmful, since
hypertension and high cholesterol and the other risk-based diseases would cer-
tainly satisfy such a criterion.But they do not satisfy the dysfunction requirement:
most patients currently classified as having stage 1 hypertension or high choles-
terol do not have any dysfunction. By the DR approach, therefore, these patients
do not have a disease.
Boorse’s theory provides the clearest account of judgments regarding dys-
function and their role in judgments about disease-status. Here are the three key
parts of his definition:
1. The reference class is a natural class of organisms of uniform functional
design; specifically, an age group of a sex of a species.
2. A normal function of a part or process within members of the reference
class is a statistically typical contribution by it to their individual sur-
vival and reproduction.
3. A disease is a type of internal state that is either [a] an impairment of
normal functional ability, i.e. a reduction of one or more functional
abilities below typical efficiency, or [b] a limitation on functional ability
caused by environmental agents (Boorse 1997, pp. 7–8; a and b added
under 3 for clarity).
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Most diseases count as such because of criterion 3a rather than 3b. Consider
congestive heart failure (CHF) in a 50-year-old man.The human heart has the
function of pumping blood; this is what it does that typically contributes to sur-
vival and reproduction. If the heart in a typical 50-year-old man has an ejection
fraction of 50%, and the heart of the individual with CHF has an ejection frac-
tion of just 15%, the latter’s heart is beating significantly “below typical effi-
ciency,” and it thus counts as pathological according to premise 3a.
A number of factors will play a role in determining exactly how low a heart’s
ejection fraction must be before it counts as dysfunctional rather than just on the
low side of normal (Schwartz 2007b), and there will always be some arbitrari-
ness in drawing this line (Boorse 1977, 1987). In most cases, however, it is clear
when a level of functioning is abnormal, since it falls below that of a vast major-
ity of the members of the reference class and brings serious symptoms and func-
tional deficits (Boorse 1977, 1987). In such classic conditions as renal failure, em-
physema, or hip fracture, the kidney, lungs, or femur, respectively, are unable to
carry out their function at anything like typical efficiency.
Hypertension
Now consider these issues for the diagnosis of hypertension in patient MH.
Using Boorse’s terminology (premise 3a), I would argue that because there is no
internal part or process that is functioning below “typical efficiency,” there is no
disease.
The relevant biology is complex but relatively well understood. Myriad phys-
iological factors affect a person’s blood pressure, including arterial resistance and
elasticity, the strength and rate of cardiac contractions, kidney function, and nu-
merous hormones that affect all these. Complex feedback loops usually keep
blood pressure in a relatively narrow range. I’ll call this interrelated web the
“blood-pressure system” for brevity.
The first clear function of the blood-pressure system is making sure that blood
pressure does not drop too low, which can interfere with blood flow to the brain
and other vital organs. Fainting, for instance, occurs when the blood pressure
drops too low to adequately perfuse the brain. But MH’s blood pressure of 150/
80 mm Hg is certainly high enough to adequately perfuse vital organs. Her
blood-pressure system is functioning normally in this regard.
Another function of the blood-pressure system is to keep blood pressure from
getting dangerously high.At a blood pressure of 210/130 mm Hg, for instance,
patients frequently will have a headache and visual changes, and at times there
will be demonstrable dysfunction of the kidneys, eyes, or brain. At this blood
pressure level, called “urgent hypertension,” arteries and arterioles constrict,
which protects target organs from the excessive pressures but drastically dimin-
ishes blood flow. For this reason, a DR account has no trouble classifying urgent
hypertension as a disease.A patient like MH,with stage 1 hypertension, however,
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does not exhibit these problems, since her “elevated” blood pressure causes no
symptoms or dysfunction in other organs.
Stage 2 hypertension falls somewhere in the middle: patients may be like
MH—with no symptoms and no dysfunction—or they may have such problems.
Thus, some patients will probably count as having a disease by a DR account
and others won’t. For simplicity, I shall focus on stage 1 hypertension here,where
such signs or symptoms are rare.
It is reasonable to ask whether I have overlooked a possible function of the
blood-pressure system that could justify classifying patients like MH as harbor-
ing dysfunction. Perhaps the system should be counted as having the function of
keeping blood pressure low enough to minimize the risk of future cardiovascu-
lar disease. If the system has that function, then, one might think, there could be
dysfunction present in patients with stage 1 hypertension.
But there are two steps to this suggestion, and each has important problems.
First, the idea of assigning the blood-pressure system the function of minimizing
future cardiovascular risk is at least strained. Function is assigned (as in premise
2, above) by looking at the contributions the system makes to survival and repro-
duction at the current time or under specific possible circumstances. So claim-
ing that a system has the function of reducing future risk is odd at least.
Second, even if we assign the blood-pressure system the function of mini-
mizing future cardiovascular risk, in a patient like MH it appears that it is func-
tioning at “typical efficiency” for doing this. Remember that there is a wide
range of blood pressures in women of her age, and 150/80 mm Hg does not fall
far from the mean.Although she may have slightly higher risk of a future heart
attack than someone with a lower blood pressure, this looks more like a part of
normal variation than like dysfunction. What matters for the guidelines con-
cerning diagnosing and treating hypertension is just that her risk is higher than
it could be with available medications. It is untenable to label the blood-pressure
system as dysfunctioning for this reason alone.
Considering Hunter-Gatherer Societies
Not all societies, admittedly, have such a high prevalence of blood pressures in
the range of stage 1 hypertension. In traditional hunter-gatherer societies, for in-
stance, 60-year-olds have an average blood pressure of just 110/70 (Law and
Wald 2002). In comparison to individuals in such a group, MH’s blood pressure
places her at an uncommonly high risk of cardiovascular disease. From this per-
spective, MH’s blood-pressure system might be considered to be failing to func-
tion at “typical efficiency” for controlling the risk of cardiovascular disease
(again, assuming that is accepted as a function of the system).
This conjecture, however, has little to do with judging whether her blood
pressure counts as dysfunctional by premise 3a. According to that premise, the
functional efficacy must be compared to other members of the reference class (of
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individuals of her age and gender in the current population), and, I have argued,
by this test her blood-pressure system will appear functional.
Premise 3b appears more relevant to the proposal that her blood-pressure and
cardiovascular risk should be compared to those found in individuals living in
traditional societies.According this premise, an internal state counts as dysfunc-
tional if it represents “a limitation on functional ability caused by environmental
agents.” The higher average blood pressure of contemporary society is almost
certainly due to environmental factors, such as increased intake of salt, fat, and
calories, coupled with decreased exercise and increased body mass index.At first
glance, it looks like this perspective could justify counting stage 1 hypertension
as dysfunction.
On closer examination, however, this approach runs into serious problems. In
particular, using premise 3b in this way would result in the conclusion that basi-
cally everybody living in contemporary society harbors dysfunction. Even peo-
ple with normal blood pressures by current guidelines have a much increased
risk of cardiovascular disease compared to people living in a hunter-gatherer
society. From this perspective, the current cutoffs for diagnosing stage 1 hyper-
tension would make little sense.
In addition, for basically all members of contemporary society, the risk of can-
cer is also most likely orders of magnitude higher than in traditional settings, due
to the presence of pollutants and other toxins and aspects of modern life.These
environmental agents impact myriad mechanisms at the genetic, cellular, and tis-
sue level, resulting in increased rates of cancer (Dale and Federman 2007).
Premise 3b faces other significant problems as well, so much so that Boorse
(2002) has recently discussed removing it from his account. He originally added
the premise to handle some hypothetical cases where a single agent, such as a
toxin or a virus, causes widespread dysfunction.Using it in cases where the over-
all environment has changed in so many ways simply introduces too many com-
plications to rely on this to justify counting stage 1 hypertension as dysfunction.
Finally, given how the guidelines for diagnosing hypertension have evolved, it
would be surprising if facts about risks in traditional hunter-gatherer societies
were crucial. As summarized above, the guidelines regarding this condition are
based on evidence that treating the levels above the cutoffs can reduce overall
cardiovascular morbidity and mortality.Whether or not lower levels were com-
mon at previous times in human history seems irrelevant.
High Cholesterol
As described above, MH also has an LDL of 140 mg/dL and thus counts as
having high cholesterol. But again, there is no reason to see her as harboring dys-
function. Cholesterol has various functions in the body, including use in cellu-
lar membranes, and there are numerous systems that determine the levels of the
various molecules that participate in cholesterol metabolism (Dale and Feder-
man 2007).An LDL of 140 mg/dL causes no demonstrable problems, and there
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is no reason to think that this level is too high or too low for the body’s needs.
Therefore there is also no clear reason to see the systems that metabolize, trans-
port, and store cholesterol as dysfunctioning in any way.
In contrast, patients with familial hypercholesterolemia develop dangerously
high levels due to mutations in the proteins involved in cholesterol metabolism,
and thus clearly do harbor dysfunction (Dale and Federman 2007).No such dys-
functions have been identified in the great majority of people like MH with
high cholesterol. As mentioned above, her LDL level is actually below the
median for women her age in the United States (ATP III,Appendix III-A).
In short, it is not the lack of symptoms that stops hypertension or high cho-
lesterol from counting as diseases, but the absence of any dysfunction.There are
numerous asymptomatic diseases, such as small tumors or early cirrhosis or kid-
ney failure, for instance, but in those cases there is demonstrable dysfunction. In
the case of cancer, certain mechanisms are failing to perform their usual function
of controlling cell division (Dale and Federman 2007). In the case of stage 1
hypertension and high cholesterol, in contrast, there is no dysfunction, as well as
usually no symptoms, and thus no disease.
The only approach that would classify MH’s cholesterol level as disease would
be, first, to assign the system of cholesterol metabolism and storage as having the
function of minimizing future cardiovascular risk, and second, to compare mod-
ern individuals to people living in hunter-gatherer societies. Such an approach
faces the same problems it did when discussing hypertension, perhaps most im-
portantly the consequence that all modern individuals would most likely be
counted as harboring dysfunction. If the notion of dysfunction applied to a case
like this, it would be a poor criterion for the presence of disease.
Non-Dysfunction-Requiring Definitions of Disease
Many definitions of “disease” do not include a requirement that biological
dysfunction is present, and such non-DR theories may classify stage 1 hyperten-
sion and high cholesterol as diseases. For example, consider Culver and Gert’s
(1982) “malady” account:“A person has a malady if and only if he has a condi-
tion, other than his rational beliefs and desires, such that he is suffering, or at in-
creased risk of suffering, an evil (death, pain, disability, loss of freedom or oppor-
tunity, or loss of pleasure) in the absence of a distinct sustaining cause” (Culver
and Gert 1982, p. 81). Stage 1 hypertension and high cholesterol will count as
maladies since they carry an “increased risk of suffering . . . an evil—in other
words, a cardiovascular event that would cause death, pain, or disability.
This classification, however, should not lead us to conclude that stage 1 hyper-
tension or high cholesterol are in fact diseases, due to the serious defects in non-
DR accounts. In particular, Culver and Gert’s analysis counts as maladies many
conditions that are clearly not pathological. For example, in a bigoted society,
having a certain skin color will bring risk of “loss of freedom or opportunity,”
and thus would be a malady. Similarly, being female in a sexist society or being
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a pacifist in a warlike society could be maladies. Even pregnancy, a prototypically
healthy state, will count as a malady due to the risks it brings. (In a later article,
Culver and Gert have accepted the counterintuitive classification of pregnancy
as malady; Gert, Culver, and Danner Clouser 1997). Finally, the vague concept
of “increased risk” could justify counting all contemporary Westerners as having
a “malady,” due to the fact that they have higher risks of heart disease and can-
cer than those living in traditional, hunter-gatherer societies.
In short, non-DR definitions are overly inclusive, and this feature leads them
to classify stage 1 hypertension and high cholesterol as diseases. Like others, I be-
lieve that this over-inclusiveness and other problems make the non-DR ap-
proach unattractive as an account of the concept of disease in biology or medi-
cine. Advocates of the non-DR approach might point to its inclusion of the
risk-based diseases as a virtue and might claim that the existence of such diseases
favors the non-DR approach over DR accounts, but I would reject this: classi-
fying stage 1 hypertension and high cholesterol as pathological highlights the
weakness of the non-DR approach, not its strength.
Stage 1 Hypertension, High Cholesterol,
and Health-Care Justice
Concluding that stage 1 hypertension and high cholesterol are not diseases might
seem to significantly weaken the basis for treating them. The motivation for
labeling modifiable risk as pathological, after all, came from the emphasis that
medicine puts on disease. Health insurance generally covers treatment for illness,
not for healthy conditions.Treatment of heart failure is covered, for instance, but
cosmetic surgery is not. Interventions on healthy states often are classified as “en-
hancements” rather than treatment (Daniels 2000) and are viewed skeptically by
many.
If stage 1 hypertension and high cholesterol are not diseases, as I have argued,
then medical interventions for them will not be treatment but instead will be
prevention. And given the disease-centered model of current medical care and
health insurance, there is some ambiguity about the status of preventive services.
On the one hand, it is treatment offered to healthy people, like cosmetic surgery
or other “enhancements,” but on the other hand, it is a way to combat disease.
What can we say about the status of preventive services in medicine, now that it
appears that care for stage 1 hypertension and high cholesterol will usually fall
in this category?
To address this question, I shall draw on a prominent account of health-care
justice presented by Norman Daniels (1985, 2000). According to his account,
which is situated within John Rawls’s political philosophy, the “primary ration-
ale of medical obligations” is treating disease. In short, the basic health-care pack-
age—the standard health insurance policy, in many systems—will be focused on
treating diseases defined by a DR account.This is not to say that being a treat-
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ment for a disease is a strictly necessary or sufficient condition for being included
in the package: some treatments for disease may be excluded due to their expense
or burden (Daniels 2000).And some interventions on healthy states—conditions
where there is no disease present—may be covered for specific ethical reasons.
For example, Daniels (2000) argues that abortion may be a necessary service to
provide to pregnant women, even though no disease is present, due to the need
to protect equality for women. Still, the primary rationale for medical care in-
cludes mostly treatment for disease. It appears from this perspective that there is
a chance that treatment for stage 1 hypertension and high cholesterol, like other
preventive services, will fall outside the primary rationale of health care.
A closer examination of Daniels’s account, however, shows that such care will
be included under the primary rationale. In short, preventive care—reducing the
risk of future diseases—will be just as central to health care as treating diseases
once they arise.
To understand this, it is necessary to review the reason that providing standard
treatments for disease is considered as falling in the primary rationale of medi-
cine according to Daniels’s theory.The key issue is the need to protect fair equal-
ity of opportunity, a central concern of liberal political philosophy. In a Rawlsian
system, people must have fair equality of opportunity to compete for positions
that carry rewards such as higher wages or other goods. Fair equality of oppor-
tunity does not require that all members of society have an equal chance of ob-
taining desirable positions. A person with less than average intelligence, for in-
stance, will not have as good a chance of becoming a physician as smarter
individuals. But some reasons for differential opportunity are not acceptable—
for instance, if there is discrimination on the basis of gender or race.
Rawls’s principle of fair equality of opportunity goes much further than this,
though.He writes that, overall,“those with similar abilities and skills should have
similar life chances. More specifically . . . those who are at the same level of tal-
ent and ability, and have the same willingness to use them, should have the same
prospects of success regardless of their initial place in the social system” (Rawls
1971, p. 73).Thus, the need to assure fair equality of opportunity as much as pos-
sible is what justifies publicly funded education, for instance.Without such a sys-
tem, children who are born to poorer families will not be able to compete with
children of equal ability and willingness to work who are born to richer fami-
lies. There is little prospect of eliminating all such differences, of course, but they
should be minimized to a reasonable degree.2
According to Daniels’s account, the basic health-care package is supported by
similar reasoning. If a person has a disease, he or she will be at a disadvantage
competing for desirable positions with healthy people who have the same abili-
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2Decisions about whether to implement or modify possible mechanisms for protecting fair equal-
ity of opportunity may involve difficult tradeoffs between freedom and equality. In the Rawlsian
system, such decisions may need to be made by participants in the original position (Daniels 2000).
02_51.3schwartz:02_51.3schwartz 320–  6/28/08  10:39 AM  Page 331
ties and willingness to apply them.Thus, providing a health-care package focused
on treating diseases will serve fair equality of opportunity.3 Medical enhance-
ments that would improve a healthy person’s ability to compete—such as a pill
that improves intelligence or diminishes the need to sleep, for instance—would
generally not be covered by the standard package, since they don’t further fair
equality of opportunity.
With Daniels’s account explicated in this way, it becomes clear that whether
or not stage 1 hypertension and high cholesterol count as diseases, their diagno-
sis and treatment will fall under the primary rationale of medical care. By treat-
ing these conditions and preventing future cardiovascular events in some people,
fair equality of opportunity is furthered. If the goal is to further equality of
opportunity, it is even better to prevent a heart attack than to treat it after it has
occurred.
Conclusion
Thus, although stage 1 hypertension and high cholesterol should not be classi-
fied as diseases, their treatment should be seen as just as central to health care as
treatments for disease.A natural question, then, is whether it matters if these con-
ditions are described as diseases or not. I believe that it does, for two reasons.
First, there is the simple point that we should call these conditions what they are.
The growing attention paid to identifying and reducing risk should not be
allowed to warp the notion of disease. It would be regrettable if the desire to im-
prove preventive care resulted in an unnecessary blurring of the distinction be-
tween health and disease.
Second, labeling stage 1 hypertension and high cholesterol as diseases has the
potential of undermining patient understanding. A doctor who recommends
treatment for these conditions is really proposing an intervention to reduce risk,
not treat disease.The treatment carries the upfront cost of the medication, the
burden of taking a pill every day and visiting the doctor regularly, and the risk
of side effects.The payoff is a reduction in the risk of future cardiovascular dis-
ease. But when hypertension or high cholesterol is described as pathological, pa-
tients may hear only that they have a disease and need treatment.
It is important to remember that the benefit of treating conditions like stage
1 hypertension and high cholesterol is a reduction in risk of only a certain mag-
nitude, not a guarantee of protection. For example, a patient like MH may have
a baseline risk (without treatment) of a 1 in 20 chance of having a heart attack
in the next 10 years. Getting treated for her hypertension and high cholesterol
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3There are important challenges to his theory, for example, questioning whether it adequately jus-
tifies treating diseases of old age, which occur after the competition for offices is over. Discussion
of these issues is ongoing, but the theory is certainly one of most important and well-defended ac-
counts in this area.
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may reduce her risk to 1 in 40. Another way to put this is that even without
treatment, she has just a small chance of having a heart attack in the next decade,
and she can reduce this risk even further by starting treatment. These specific
quantities of risk and risk reduction are rarely disclosed to patients or understood
by them, and thus the informed-consent process for such decisions is often inad-
equate (Braddock et al. 1997, 1999; Epstein et al. 2004; Paling 2003).
Admittedly, simply insisting that risk-based “diseases” be described as risk fac-
tors will not solve the extensive problems in modern medicine regarding doctor-
patient communication and patient understanding. Many more changes will be
needed to significantly improve the situation. But describing hypertension or
cholesterol as risk factors, rather than as diseases, would be an important first step.
Although I have focused my discussion here on stage 1 hypertension and high
cholesterol, these are representative of a larger group of conditions where mod-
ifiable risk is classified as disease (including diabetes, osteoporosis, and obesity).
And all these conditions reflect the growing focus of medicine on identifying
and modifying risk, with the next frontier most likely centered on genetic risk
factors. Improved prevention in all these areas can have significant benefits for
individuals and public health, but it also carries real risks, not least of all the med-
icalization of normal life. Since questions about this trend can only be clearly
discussed if we pay attention to the distinction between treatment and preven-
tion, it is important to be careful about any blurring of the line between these
crucial, but separate, goals of health care.Analyzing the representation and fram-
ing of risk in medicine is an important task for the philosophy of medicine and
ethics.
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